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CONTENTS
Price Promotion by Multi-Product Retailers:
Depth or Breadth?
Next Meeting
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NEC-63
Spring 2005
March 17-18, 2005
San Diego, CA
The Economics of Commodity Promotion Programs: Lessons from
California
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Price Promotion by Multi-Product Retailers:
Depth or Breadth?
by Timothy J. Richards and Paul M. Patterson1
1. Introduction
With the success of recent challenges to the constitutionality of generic
commodity advertising campaigns such as "Got Milk?" and "Beef:
Its What's for Dinner" and a host of others, commodity organizations
are increasingly turning to non-advertising means to market their product.
Price-promotions, or "sales," are becoming the primary alternative
to media advertising for not only commodities, but for consumer products
more generally. In fact, media experts estimate that of total marketing
communications expenditures of some $478 billion in 2004, US firms committed
only 37.5% to advertising, while promotion accounted for fully 51.9% (Myers).
Firms are finding that mass advertising simply does not provide the "bang
for the buck" that it used to in an increasingly fractionated media
marketplace. As a result, commodity organizations are not only being forced
into price promotion for legal reasons, but perhaps for economic ones.
Sales are curious things from an economist's perspective, however, as
they seem to imply that the "law of one price" does not hold.
It is not surprising, therefore, that questions of surrounding how sales
work have given rise to a vigorous debate among academic economists and
marketers for some time.
Retailers use periodic price promotions on a regular basis for a variety
of products. Although the economic rationale underlying sales for fashion
items, consumer durables and storable food products is well established,
relatively little research addresses the question of why supermarkets
promote perishable items such as fresh fruits and vegetables, dairy products
or meat? This lack of attention is particularly surprising given the importance
fresh produce plays in attracting consumers to an individual store and
the average profitability of perishable items. In fact, perishable goods
are often used as loss-leaders because they tend to be highly complementary
with other products. Fresh fruit, vegetables or meat are rarely an entire
meal, but usually an important part of every meal. Demand complementary
can explain their use as loss-leaders, but not the precise number of products
offered on sale each week, nor the size of the discount. Indeed, there
is very little research that addresses the interdependent roles of the
depth and breadth of price promotion among multi-product perishable-good
retailers. This research helps to fill this gap by developing, and testing,
a simple explanation for why grocery managers offer periodic discounts
on fresh produce.
Why Offer Discounts on Perishables?
Look at a typical "food page" ad in the local paper. How many
of the products on offer are perishable? Meat, fruit, eggs, and even bread
are regular features of nearly every supermarket insert. If they are so
popular, how do perishable product sales work?
Theories of why retail firms may find it rational to periodically reduce
prices, and then raise them again shortly thereafter, revolve around a
few key assumptions regarding either the structure of the market, firm
behavior, or consumer behavior. Whether due to search costs, differences
in information, intensity of preference, inventory cost, demand uncertainty,
or for purely strategic reasons, none of the current explanations are
appropriate when products are perishable, retailers sell multiple, possibly
complementary, goods and individual stores tend to interact in highly
competitive local markets.
For durable goods such as clothes and cars, reducing the price slowly
over time is a good way to practice "intertemporal price discrimination"
or matching the price to those who are willing to wait. But sales on perishable
items are offered on a daily basis. However, price discrimination that
exploits other sources of variation in willingness to pay among consumers
is still plausible. In fact, many consumers are loyal to a particular
store for reasons of geographic proximity, product assortment, store attributes,
or due to the effectiveness of a frequent shopper program. Moreover, with
the importance of fresh produce to overall supermarket sales, the complimentarity
of produce demand with other items may be particularly important.
Indeed, the dominant rationale given by retail managers for using price
promotions is to build store traffic. Consider how the dominant retail
channel for fresh produce, supermarkets, work. Research finds that most
of a store's customers are "regulars" who choose the store due
to its location, product selection or simply out of habit. Typically,
produce managers at supermarkets offer relatively attractive promotions
on a few products each day. For regular customers, these promotions amount
to little more than a reward for their loyalty. To attract other types
of customers - "shoppers" - supermarkets need to convince them
that a typical grocery basket will cost less than elsewhere. They can
do this in one of three ways: (1) by offering deeper promotions on a few
select products, (2) by offering the same discount on more products, or
(3) by combining the two strategies and offering deep discounts on a number
of products. While strategy (3) may seem to be "giving away the store,"
it must be remembered that supermarkets sell many different products and
the produce department is key to building overall traffic, so competing
in this way may indeed be rational.
In fact, in a related paper we develop a theoretical economic model that
shows strategy (3) is likely to be the equilibrium outcome among supermarkets
competing over the same group of consumers. The intuition is very simple.
Because there are two groups of customers (shoppers and loyal customers),
a situation in which all supermarkets charge the same price for each product
is not an option - someone will always benefit from attracting the shoppers.
Therefore, stores "randomize" their sales prices, or charge
different prices with certain probabilities each week. Further, not all
products can be loss-leaders. If a manager reduces the price on too many
products in an attempt to build traffic, then there will be none left
to generate profit! So, she faces the decision of how many to offer on
sale and how deep to cut the price - the "winner" of the sale
sweepstakes will be the one that offers the largest number of products
at the largest possible discount. As a result, we expect to see a positive
correlation between the depth of a discount offered by retailers and the
number of products offered for sale. In this way, "depth" and
"breadth" are complementary tools in a retail equilibrium. The
challenge remains, however, to determine whether this prediction is consistent
with reality.
Econometric Analysis of Price Promotion
Based on the logic outlined above, the breadth and depth of a sale are
determined together by store managers, or are jointly endogenous. Therefore,
the objective of our econometric model is to test whether or not sale
breadth and depth are positively related to each other, controlling for
the fact that they are determined together. To do so, we estimate two
models that reflect the peculiarities of each decision. First, the number
of products offered for sale is a discrete variable, or one that can only
take on integer values. Consequently, for this decision we estimate a
"Negative Binomial," or count data model. Using predicted values
from this equation to control for the endogeneity of sale breadth, the
second model consists of a Tobit equation of discount magnitude. A Tobit
(zero / positive) model is appropriate here because a product is either
not on sale (zero depth), or on sale with an uncertain depth (positive
depth). In both models, the decision to place a number of products on
sale and the size of the discount are also assumed to be driven by a number
of other factors, such as the profit margin on non-sale products, the
total number of products in the category, rival prices and numbers of
sale products, and the expected change in total sales quantity.
What did we find?
To test whether depth and breadth are complimentary or not, we use two
years of weekly store-level scanner data for a variety of fresh fruits
supplied by Fresh Look Marketing, Inc. of Chicago, IL. These data consist
of product-level (UPC or PLU code) prices and quantities for each chain
in six regional markets, for a total of 20 cross-sectional observations,
each of 104 weeks in length. After controlling for several measures of
retailing cost, the "number of sale products" model suggests
that promotional breadth and depth are indeed complementary. Another way
of thinking of this is that the larger the discount offered on any individual
product, the more products need to be offered on sale in order to maintain
a constant level of profit. In this model, we also find that the number
of sale products falls in the average margin. Intuitively, if a retailer
"buys" shoppers by taking a lower margin on loyal customers,
they will offer fewer sale products the less incremental profit they expect
to earn from the shopper segment. Third, the more different types of products
(stock keeping units, or SKUs) sold by a retailer, the more it will offer
on promotion at any given time - a necessary strategy in order to keep
the perception of promoting aggressively.
Although our findings regarding the number of sale
products are consistent with expectations, can the same be said of the
average discount offered? In this case, we expect the depth of the discount
to be negatively related to the total number of products sold, but positively
related to the number of sale products and the margin earned on them.
The results in the bottom panel of table 1 show
that the complementarity between promotional breadth and depth is a strong
factor in determining the size of a discount. In other words, retailers
recognize the fact that capturing market share requires a greater investment
the more intense the competition for critical market segments. Further,
while depth and breadth are complementary within an individual store,
these results also suggest that the number of goods a retailer stocks
and promotion are competitive substitutes, meaning that broad-line
retailers are likely to discount more deeply than limited assortment competitors.
Although the evidence is less clear, firms that earn higher margins also
promote more intensely than others. In other words, HI-LO retailers2
use higher margins, on average, to justify their use of deep promotions
on loss-leaders as a means of increasing store traffic.
Implications for Retail Promotion Strategy
This study finds that the promotional breadth (the number of promoted
products) and depth (the size of the discount) are complementary tools
in selling perishable produce at large, multi-product retail supermarket
chains. Complementarity, in this context, means that breadth and depth
tend to reinforce rather than substitute for each other. Supermarket managers,
therefore, either promote many products aggressively, or do not promote
at all and sell only to their loyal customers. Commodity organizations
working with HI-LO retailers should encourage produce managers to promote
products that are likely to be purchased with their own - complementary
in purchase if not in use - in order to make best use of their promotion
dollars. Further, if they offer a broad product line, meaning many varieties
of fruit or types of cheese, they need to maintain promotions on a larger
number of them in order for the average price of a representative basket
of groceries to stay at the same level.
Table 1: Estimation Results for U.S. Fruit Sales
Model a
| Number of Sale Products Model |
| Variablesa |
Apples |
Grapes |
Oranges |
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Estimate
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t-ratio
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Estimate
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t-ratio
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Estimate
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t-ratio
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| Constant |
1.661* |
4.454 |
-0.733* |
-1.965 |
-1.831* |
-4.963 |
| Discount |
0.959* |
4.333 |
4.024* |
12.831 |
3.444* |
12.223 |
| Margin |
-2.224* |
-4.281 |
0.738 |
0.939 |
0.144 |
0.388 |
| No of Products |
0.010* |
3.728 |
0.087* |
5.352 |
0.091* |
5.561 |
| Size of Discount Model |
| Constant |
-1.858 |
-1.344 |
-0.064 |
-0.043 |
-1.869 |
-0.629 |
| No. of Sale Products |
0.152* |
19.481 |
0.032* |
18.649 |
0.094* |
16.101 |
| Margin |
0.708* |
11.822 |
0.097* |
5.037 |
0.087* |
2.217 |
| No. of Products |
-0.005* |
-8.952 |
-0.004* |
-4.072 |
-0.001 |
-1.098 |
| a In this table, a single asterisk
indicates significance at the 5% level. Each model contains a number
of other variables, including indices of retail cost, rival prices,
rival number of sale products, rival margin and market dummy variables.
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1 Authors are Power
Professor of Agribusiness, Associate Professor and Research Associate,
respectively, in the Morrison School of Agribusiness, Arizona State University,
Mesa, AZ. 85212. Contact author: trichards@asu.edu.
Support for this project from the National Institute for Commodity Promotion
Research and Evaluation at Cornell University and the Food Systems Research
Group at the University of Wisconsin, Madison is gratefully acknowledged.
2 HI-LO retailers
use promotions on a regular basis, as opposed to everyday-low-price, EDLP,
retailers such as Wal-Mart who maintain as low prices as possible on a
daily basis.
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